Korea:
Background Sketch
Murray J. Leaf
South Korea's recent economic growth, like that of Taiwan and
Singapore, is a challenge to the idea that development requires
pluralism.
Land and People:
South Korea occupies about 45 percent of the Korean peninsula.
Its land area is 98,955 square kilometers, and its population is about
38 million. The population density is thus about 384 per square
kilometer. Most of the terrain consists of low but steep
mountains. Densities of farm population per hectare of arable
land are higher than Indonesia, Taiwan, or Japan . Just 22 percent of
the area is arable. Of this, about two-thirds is under paddy and
the remainder under upland crops. Following paddy with a winter
crop, such as rape, is most prevalent in the southeast, especially the
Naktong River valley of North Kyongsang province and South Kyongsang
province. Soils are generally acidic, and wet rice farming
requires large annual fertilizer and organic inputs to maintain
production .
Of the non-arable land, 67 percent is classed as forest, but only about
30 percent of this has more than very small trees. Three fourths of the
forest is owned privately, the rest is owned by national and provincial
governments. Forests are now managed informally by village groups to
supply fuel for heating and cooking. Forests also supply wild nuts,
mushrooms, arrowroot, medicinal herbs, and vegetables .
National Structure.
Koreans, North and South, see the present political division of the
peninsula as temporary and consider reunification necessary and
inevitable. The idea of Korea as a national and ethnic entity
goes back to the Koryo dynasty (918-1392 A.D.), which emerged out of
struggles between three tribal/regional kingdoms. The dynasty
established a national civil administration based on examination along
the lines of the T'ang administration in China and supported the
development of Buddhism by giving grants of land to monasteries and
accepting monks as advisors at court. Analogous to historically related
changes in Japan at about the same time, ruling families or clans of
the tribal kingdoms solidified into a national aristocracy who supplied
the military and administrative leadership, and the Buddhist monks. The
rest of the population were ranked as either commoners (peasants,
merchants, and craftsmen) or "outcastes," cho'onmin, consisting
of slaves, bondsmen, criminals (sometimes whole villages).
Families of the different classes are described as living in
geographically distinct areas and in distinct types of households.
The Koryo dynasty was weakened when a military coup in 1170 began a
period of aristocratic conflict and peasant rebellions. It declined
further when the collapse of the T'ang dynasty allowed Mongol
encroachment. In 1259 the northern part of the country was
incorporated into the Mongol empire. The southern part became a
tributary state, and the Koryo royal line was integrated with the
Mongol ruling family through the intermarriage of Koryo kings and
Mongol princesses .
Koryo regained its autonomy when the rising Chinese Ming Dynasty
(1366-1644) cut off Mongol control. At that point, two aristocratic
factions developed: one favoring continuing ties to the Mongols, the
other favoring Ming. "The issue was resolved in 1388 when the
pro-Ming group, led by General Yi Song-gye, seized control of the
government. In 1390 and 1391 he destroyed all land registers,
confiscated all private estates, and instituted a new landholding
system. The economic backbone of leading Koryo families was effectively
broken." The succeeding Yi dynasty (1392-1910) established
a new system of land tenure. There was no private ownership; all
land was state land. Individuals merely held it and paid rent,
according to their position in the state. The basic rent to the king
was, initially, 10 percent of the crop and a fixed annual rent (in
grain) depending on the grade of the land. If there was an
intermediary, this rent was still due to the king; the intermediary
would collect much more from the actual farmer, usually well over 50
percent. The actual farmers (peasants) were made liable for the
tax in groups of five within villages; if one person (family) of the
group did not pay, the others would have to make it up. At the same
time, farmers and their lands were registered by village, forbidden to
leave their village, and required to carry a plaque showing the
registration at all times.
The Yi bureaucracy was formally divided into the yangban (literally
two-class) system -- civil and military. The civil was ranked higher,
to quell the military adventurism that had characterized the preceding
period. The military class could contain commoners. Confucian learning
was given greater emphasis and Buddhism less -- in part probably to
reduce the power of the monasteries. Only persons of the aristocratic
class had the right to sit for the examinations to qualify for the
national administration. But at the same time, unlike the
comparable samurai under the Shogun system in Japan, the yangban
remained able to own land. Yangban status could linger with a
family for generations after the last actual person in that family had
served in office.
Office-holders were allocated land according to rank, in what is called
the "status-land" system. There were eighteen ranks in the
central government service, and shares in land ranged around 2 to
3 hectares. More was not required since the land was only for
subsistence, and not to maintain troops. Local government was also
staffed with yangbans, who were also paid with allocations of land in
their areas, but unlike the central staff they were not regularly
rotated between posts to prevent connecting their offices to local
interests. Landholding tenure for all officers was for life only,
except that if an officer-holder died and left a widow and children,
they would be able to retain the land until the children were grown or
the woman remarried. The rent was a fixed 50 percent of the crop,
and the yangban was not liable for the ordinary tax paid to the king.
Peasants who actually farmed the land and paid the rent had a right to
remain without possibility of being dispossessed. The system has
obvious ambiguities that invite private expropriation. It was intended
to be supervised by the state , and for that reason was confined to the
area around the capital, Seoul. Supervision was complicated, however,
by the fact that there was not actually a blanket prohibition on other
types of superior owners apart from the king and office-holding
yangbans, particularly in remote areas. There was a class of
"military land" consisting of estates carried over from the preceding
kingdoms, and land could simply be acquired with or without benefit of
law and farmed with tenants, bondsmen, or slaves, so long as the king's
share was paid. Repeated reforms aimed at breaking up estates of
yangbans and reducing excessive rents show that the system
continuously eroded and had to be restored.
In 1590, Toyotomi Hideyoshi attacked Korea as part of his effort to
consolidate power in Japan in what would become the Tokugawa Shogunate.
The war lasted until 1597. Manchu invasions followed in 1627 and 1637,
and the Yi dynasty became a vassal state of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty
in China, beginning a policy of isolation, with limited openings only
to Japan, that would be maintained until the mid-19th century.
Then, the Yi dynasty was ended by substantially the same forces that
brought down the Ch'ing dynasty itself: the rise of Western power,
including Japanese power after the Meiji reformation, and the inability
to reconcile Confucianism and the privileges it defined for the
administrative class with the need for modern government to incorporate
scientific and technological expertise. In Korea, this was
compounded by the persistent inability of the ruling class to control
its factionalism and pursue something like national interests.
Yangban factions were groups of families forming alliances to gain
power at court and advantage in the countryside, down to the village
level. They could interfere with royal decisions, and their interests
were often opposed to those of commoners. For example, they opposed
various fiscal reforms including tax based on actual yield rather a
fixed amount based on a theoretical yield. They did not protect the
guarantee of security for tenants. They resisted the use of the Korean
vernacular when a Korean syllabary was developed. As David
Steinberg puts it: "Official Korea in this dynasty was
essentially a yangban enclave, and this group..., or
whatever faction of it was in power at the time, severely curtailed the
theoretically absolute power of the monarch. Relatively small at first,
this group began to expand rapidly some centuries later, until it
constituted more than 20 percent of the population."
After the Sino-Japanese war, the Treaty of Shimonoseki placed the Yi
monarchy under Japanese hegemony. This was followed by the Japanese
government dictating a series of administrative and military reforms,
paralleling Japan's own Meiji restoration. These included the
introduction of a Western styled cabinet government fundamentally
similar to that of Japan itself (based on a German model), elimination
of the Confucian civil service examinations, and abolition of
slavery. The Japanese victory in the subsequent Russo-Japanese
war allowed the Japanese to establish a protectorate, and the 1905
Taft-Katsura agreement paved the way for annexation.
In 1910, Korea was formally incorporated into the Japanese Empire. The
Japanese Cabinet established a Bureau of Colonial Affairs with
authority over Korean problems and a Resident-General was sent to
Korea. On August 22, 1910, under a Treaty of Annexation, "Japan
acquired complete sovereignty over Korea and assumed responsibility for
its entire government and administration... Henceforth Koreans were to
be subject to Japanese rulers and to Japanese law" . The administration
was under military command, but the staff were largely civilian.
The Japanese policy was to build up the Korean economy with capital
investments, but obliterate its cultural and organizational autonomy.
The Japanese administration had far more Japanese per capita and
attempted to exercise far more detailed control of Korean life than in
other colonial systems. In the 1940s, the Japanese had 704,000
civilians and 179,000 military personnel in Korea ." They
developed substantial hydroelectric facilities together with the
industry that relied on them. These were important to the
developing Japanese war effort. Korean annual economic growth between
1911 and 1938 averaged 3.5 percent, compared to 3.4 percent in Japan.
In that same period, manufacturing rose by 10 percent per year (from an
infinitesimal base). In contrast to many colonial powers, Japan did not
import primary products for processing from Korea but instead
established processing facilities in the colony .
They also took over and reorganized agriculture: "massive amounts of
the best Korean arable land were alienated to the Japanese, who
were encouraged to emigrate to Korea. Korea was important as a rice
exporting region to make up part of the deficit that the main islands
suffered. The Japanese invested in agricultural science, and built a
system of agricultural extension support into their reformed local
government, which was retained and ultimately provided and important
support for Korea's agricultural growth. But ... Korean
consumption actually declined, since about half of rice production was
exported to Japan and this was only partly replaced by coarser grains,
such as barley and millet."
In 1908, the Japanese had formed the Oriental Development Company on
the model of the British East India Company to encourage investment and
emigration . The company bought untitled, crown, and military
land, gaining control ultimately of about 154,000 hectares and 300,000
tenant farmers. At its height it owned about 20 percent of Korea's
arable land. This accumulation was greatly facilitated by an extensive
eight year land survey that began in 1910. The survey forced
registration of all land, assigning rights of ownership to individuals
for the first time, and also for the first time showed exactly how much
land was actually available. Under this procedure, if a farmer was
paying rent to a yangban the yangban was taken as the owner. If the
farmer could establish he was not paying rent, he could be taken as the
owner. But if the farmer was paying rent directly to the king,
and said so, the land was taken as "crown land" and the Japanese
Government, as successor to the monarchy, became the owner
directly. The Japanese also nationalized more than 4 million
hectares of village and grave forests and turned them over to Japanese
companies. .
"By 1930, 75% of farmers were in debt, and three-quarters of that debt
was to Japanese financial institutions. Tenancy and partial tenancy
became the norm; some 12 million people (2.3 million families) were
tenants, paying exorbitant rents. There was migration out of
rural areas; in 1925, 2.8 percent of such migrants went to Manchuria
and Siberia, 19.9 percent to Japan, and 46.4 percent to Korean urban
areas, where living standards were also low." Koreans were
pressed to work in Japanese war industry. From 1937, they were
encouraged to enlist in the Japanese military. From 1942, they were
conscripted .
About eight secondary schools with modern curricula and one college had
been built in Korea by Western Missionaries (mainly American and
British) in the last decade of the Yi dynasty. But the Japanese built
the first modern school system on any scale, primarily for their own
immigrants but also for Koreans. In 1919 42,767 Japanese children
were attending 379 schools in Korea. At the same time, 84,8306
Korean children attended 498 public and 33 private schools . In 1945,
there were 1,366,024 Koreans in primary schools and 83,514 in secondary
schools . By 1978, the number of primary students had increase 2.27
times, and the number of secondary students nearly 20 times . The
Japanese contribution, however, is remembered with bitterness because
of the role of the schools in Japan's program to "obliterate Korean
History, Language , and even personal names in an effort to integrate
Korea culturally in the ... Empire ." The Japanese Government
banned use of Korean in schools in 1938.
The colonial administration used the yangban for its own ends, and some
could benefit from the occupation. In the early years, the
Japanese created seventy-six Korean peers to reward cooperation. One
third to one quarter of the student body of Keijo Imperial University
was open to Koreans; other Koreans who had money were educated in
Japan, and ambitious but poor commoners went into the Japanese army.
The colonial period ended with the surrender of Japan in 1945, followed
immediately by the de facto division along the 38th parallel. South
Korea came under the same Allied area command that had responsibility
for Japan and the Philippines. But Japan was a surrendered belligerent
and Korea was a liberated colony. As a result, while the United
States had a legal mandate to reorganize the Japanese political and
economic system and remove those features that had lent themselves to
the rise of totalitarianism and militarism, its mandate for Korea was
only to restore it promptly to independence. Thus Korea passed
into the post war period with a governmental structure much more like
that of war-time Japan than the governmental structure of Japan itself.
Steinberg sums up: "The legacy of the Japanese colonial period remains
vibrant today. Korean laws and administrative regulations are largely
holdovers from the Japanese (who in many cases adapted them from the
Germans.) Japanese modern farming, irrigation and, agricultural
research services formed the basis on which Korea was able to expand
and modernize its rural sector. Japanese industry, taken over at the
end of the war by Korean entrepreneurs who had held relatively junior
positions in those firms, sometimes became major Korean
corporations. In 1945, the Japanese left behind in Korea
substantial corporate assets. The leading 2,000 firms were worth some
$4.6 billion. Sixty-eight percent of these firms were owned by
Japanese; 27 percent were under joint Japanese-Korean control, but with
the Japanese predominant; and only 5 percent were completely
Korean-owned. Educated Koreans over fifty speak Japanese, having been
schooled at least through primary level in that language. In
contrast, the North Korean leadership claims legitimacy partly on the
basis of its anti-Japanese activities. "
Important Japanese institutions that carried over into post-war Korea
included "the Bank of Chosen [Korea], the system of secondary school
education, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the secret police, the
Agricultural Bank, and the complex of experimental farms and
agricultural extension service facilities at Suweon... ."
Since Independence, South Korean political and social life have been
dominated by three interrelated conflicts: the struggle with the North
for military superiority and moral/political legitimacy, the struggle
of some yangban to reestablish a class hegemony and dominate the
government (which other yangban have opposed), and the continuing
formation of factions within Korea that reflect opposed policies toward
the strategic position of Korea between Japan and China and, beyond
them, the United States and Russia.
The First Republic of Korea was established on August 15, 1948, with
Syngman Rhee as president. The Democratic People's Republic of
Korea was instituted on September 9, 1948. Both claimed to be the
government for all of Korea. United States troops were withdrawn in
June of 1949. North Korea attacked in June of 1950.
One of the main initiatives of the American Military Government had
been land reform. Military Government Ordinance Number 9 set the annual
rent limit at 1/3 of previous levels. All land owned by the Japanese
was vested in the government-owned New Korea Company for redistribution
pending approval of a scheme by provisional Korean government. Attempts
to approve legislation in 1947 and 1948 failed to pass the Legislative
Assembly. So "In March 1948 United States Military Government Ordinance
No. 173 dissolved the New Korea Company and transferred the lands to
the newly established National Land Administration to be distributed to
former tenants under a two-hectare ...limit, at a price of 150% of one
year's production to be paid over a fifteen-year period. While the land
was being paid for, the new owner could not sell it. Over 90
percent of those lands, amounting to 606,518 acres, were so disposed of
."
The land reform act of 1950 which followed was "to distribute the
remaining Japanese holdings and to break up the large, private Korean
landholdings that were being established ." Although the
Korean War intervened during implementation, it probably assured
success "because it made it difficult for landowners to consolidate
their opposition and gave strength to the proprietary claims of those
former tenants who stayed on their land while it was being fought over
and because implementation greatly served domestic propaganda purposes
." The government was to purchase all holdings in excess of three
hectares and all land not being farmed by the owner himself. Absentee
ownership became illegal. About 30 percent of all arable land was
ultimately redistributed by the time the process was completed in
1957. Observers agree that the land reform was a major reason why
governments until the 1960's could rely on rural complaisance even
though rural people remained poor. Land reform eliminated the yangban
as the dominant rural landholding class.
The war caused enormous physical destruction. North Korea lost "over 11
percent of its population; in the South there was massive dislocation
and death."... "In Seoul, 80 percent of the industry, public utilities,
and transport and three-quarters of office buildings and half the
dwellings were destroyed.. Gross national product...fell by 16 percent,
agricultural production declined by one-quarter, and the meager
standard of living deteriorated ."
Rhee had refused any agreement to end the Korean War that left Korea
divided, and South Korea was not a signatory to the truce of July 27,
1953. Rhee finally agreed to a cease fire only on condition that
the United States sign a bilateral defence treaty with the South and
greatly expand the Republic's military capability.
For Rhee's entire term, the government failed to agree on a
constitutional form. Rhee came to office under a constitution with a
strong presidential chief executive. The opposition-dominated National
Assembly wanted to replace the president with a parliamentary cabinet.
Rhee forced through amendments calling for popular election of the
president and then a lifetime presidential term. Elections and
legislative politics were notoriously corrupt and civil liberties
increasingly disregarded. Finally, widespread civil unrest after the
1960 elections led to his resignation.
Steinberg describes economic policies of Rhee period as "a poor record
of growth, a virtual absence of economic planning, an intense effort to
manipulate the foreign aid program on which Korea relied, rapid
inflation, and unrealistic multiple exchange rates that diverted
entrepreneurial talents from production and exports, ... toward
speculation ." United States aid in this period provided more
than 1/3 the national budget. Rhee deliberately avoided
stimulating agriculture, which he feared might strengthen his political
opposition. Rather, his policies were to keep producer prices
low--often below the costs of production. U.S.PL-480 food
assistance was used to bridge the gap for the urban population
Farmers accordingly produced only for subsistence. Nevertheless some
government agencies did begin planning efforts that later bore fruit,
including the Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry.
The Second Republic was a nine-month interlude that saw more than 2,000
demonstrations with 900,000 participants. The government returned
to a parliamentary system, but conflicting power-blocs would not
compromise. "The press was free, often given to license and
irresponsibility, even blackmail. The hope that had initiated
this period gradually deteriorated into dismay ."
The Third Republic began on May 16, 1961, when a military coup deposed
the elected government, dissolved the National Assembly, and
established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction headed by
Major General Park Chung Hee. Park quickly became de facto head of
state. The military government set a program to replace themselves with
a civilian government, founded the Democratic Republican Party in which
most of the military officers were later to run as civilians, and laid
the bases for an increasingly totalitarian administration. These
included a large scale administrative reorganization including local
government. They also established the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency as a comprehensive secret police organization for both internal
and external surveillance.
In 1962, the government adopted its first five year plan. It called for
"unbalanced" growth with heavy emphasis on electric power, agriculture,
and "social overhead capital." Private industry would carry it out.
Park encouraged the formation of industrial conglomerates, called
chaebol, on the pattern of the pre-1945 Japanese zaibatsu, with the
difference that banking stayed with the government Bank of Korea.
The government then controlled the chaebol by providing or denying
subsidized credit. Growth in the first plan period exceeded
targets in all areas except agriculture. 1962 saw an upturn in Korean
economic growth that continued to accelerate. In the late 1960's an
important area of growth was in fertilizer production, for which there
was a ready internal market.
In 1963, Park was narrowly elected president of the new civilian
government.
In the elections of 1971, the opposition won 89 seats to 113 for
government. The election showed the government's rural
support had eroded. At the same time, PL 480 had been changed from a
grant to a loan program. Paying for the grain to make up Korea's
production deficit was a serious financial drain. The government
responded with a substantial increase in rural investment and with
saemaul undong, as will be described in the next three chapters.
On Oct 17, 1972 the Fourth Republic was begun when Park (following
Marcos' example in the Philippines) declared a national emergency and
martial law "which essentially gave him unlimited power ."
Park's new (Yushin) constitution was ratified in Nov 1972 in national
referendum. Under it, the president, elected indirectly by secret
ballot without debate by a "National Council for Unification" had
unlimited tenure and substantially unlimited power . Steinberg
characterizes it as "The most centralized, autocratic, and dictatorial
regime in Korean history ."
In the mid-1970's, partly in response to improved relations between the
U.S. and China and the prospect of reduced U.S. military support, the
government under president Park's direction began a costly program to
develop heavy, chemical, and defence industries for internal use and
for export. The program "required extensive borrowing from
abroad, and it created excess industrial capacity that could not be
gainfully used at that time. Financial institutions were saddled with
debts at impossibly low interest rates... for which there was little or
no economic return. Excessive inflation returned, and by March
1979, the Korean government and the president personally recognized the
need for a painful economic stabilization program... In October,
however, before this program could be implemented, Park was
assassinated, causing further economic dislocation and necessitating
major structural adjustment in the economy, for the subsidies to heavy
industry and agriculture could not be sustained."
After Park's death, Choi Kyu Ha became interim president and
efforts began again to liberalize the constitution. These were cut
short, and the Fifth Republic initiated, on December 12, 1979, by a
coup carried out by General Chun Doo Hwan. On May 18, 1979,
demonstrations begun by students grew into what came to be known as
the Kwangju rebellion. It was put down by special forces troops,
with a death toll perhaps as high as 2000 (opposition figure).
"The Kwangju rebellion seriously impaired any sense of legitimacy that
the Chun regime might have hoped to have. The United States was
severely damaged by it as well, for the popular impression was that all
Korean forces were ... under U.S. leadership. Although [actually]...
the special forces and certain other troops were excluded... ."
Subsequently, anti-US sentiment and resistance to government continued
to rise, as students and labor unions joined forces.
Despite these difficulties, in 1984 Korea's overall balance of trade
shifted from negative to neutral. It went positive in 1986. The balance
with Japan has remained consistently negative, however, because of
Korea's continuing reliance on Japanese parts to use in assembled goods
exported to third countries. Its trade balance with the US has
been positive since 1982.
Continuing large-scale opposition led Chun on June 10th, 1987, to
designate Roh Tae Woo as his successor. Then, "In a move
that stunned much of the government ...as well as the opposition, Roh
announced on June 29 that the government would agree to the direct
election of the president and that political liberalization would take
place, with stringent laws terminated, political prisoners released,
and the political rights of [opposition leader] Kim Dae Jung
restored. Two days later President Chun endorsed this plan ."
In this election, the opposition split their vote and Roh won with 36
percent of the ballots. The Sixth Republic began on February 25
1988, with Roh Tae Woo as President. The Government had 125
seats and opposition 174 seats. It is too soon to see where it is
leading, but outside observers are hopeful. "Forces in Korean
society have gained the strength to move Korea from merely exercising
the trappings and forms of democracy to allowing some of the content
associated with it. As Korean society changes, more stress on
plural values and institutions, less hierarchy, and broader
representation are likely ."
Local Government:
In the Republic of Korea, as in pre-1945 Japan, local government and
police are both under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The country
is administratively divided into nine provinces (do) and two special
cities, Seoul and Pusan. Eight of the nine provinces date back to
the Yi dynasty. The ninth, Chejudo Island, was created after 1945
.
Provinces are subdivided into counties (kun) and cities (si). Kun and
si are parallel units. Counties (kun) in turn are divided into towns
(up) and townships (myong), which are also parallel. The
difference depends on population. myong are smaller and more rural.
Both can contain agricultural lands and both have the same basic
administrative offices including police, agricultural services, and
market facilities. The townships (myong) in turn are groupings of
villages (ri or li). Cities are divided into communities or wards
(ku) which are subdivided into blocks (dong).
Villages (ri) are of three types: natural, administrative, and
legal. The natural village is a distinct cluster of
households. Because of the constraints of the topography, these
are generally irregular and variable in size and shape, being placed
wherever sites can be found in a convenient relation to the
householders fields. Organizationally, they are of two major
types: single clan villages and multi-clan villages. In the
former case the villagers all have a commonly accepted hierarchy of
family relationships based on descent, and in the latter case they do
not.
The administrative ri and the legal ri both go back to the Local
Government Law (also translated as Local Autonomy Law) of 1949. The
administrative village is a grouping natural villages with a number of
officially recognized village chiefs equal to the number of natural ris
that make it up, although the natural ris themselves are not officially
recognized units.
The legal village is cadastral, defined with the intention of
facilitating development. It consists of an exclusive set of
lands owned by a set of persons in a village. But because people own
widely scattered plots which need not all be by one cluster of houses,
delineations were complicated and irregular, and the units have not
proved useful. Legal ris have no heads.
In the Yi dynasty, the hierarchy was simpler and the natural ri was a
functional unit of government. Do governors and kun chiefs were
appointed from the central civil service. Governors were rotated every
360 days, and kun heads every 1800 days. The latter were assisted by a
staff, also yangban, but of a local and not central service. The myong
was a subdivision of the kun and the lowest appointed officer was at
the myong level. His function was primarily liaison; he had no
decision-making power. Parallel to him was a myong chief who was
elected from the myong itself, and below him a similarly elected ri or
dong chief in each natural ri or dong. Ri and dong chiefs were
selected by consensus of household heads, and managed the village
commons, or common properties. These commons were of two types:
material and social. Material common property included such things as
water works, communal land, and forests. Social common property
included village ceremonies and five set forms of collective action.
These were the ke, dong ture, (ordinary) ture, pumasi and hyongyaku.
Ke, the only form that still survives, was simply a group of people who
agree to obtain some consumption good and share it. It was consumption
oriented and purely voluntary. Dong ture, by contrast, was a
compulsory levee of labor and money (rice) on each household in the ri
for maintaining collective productive works, such as village weirs,
wells, and the like. Each household (except those with widows and
small children only) would be require to provide one adult male and a
certain amount of money for a set amount of time. Labor went into
the work, and the money was used to feed the workers and to provide
compensation for the households of the poor who would not benefit from
the work as much as the wealthy. Ordinary ture and pumasi were
labor pooling arrangements, where a group of farmers (stereotypically)
would agree to pool their labor for operations that are best done in
groups, and again money would be used to compensate those who might
have less land for the extra work they would have done for those who
had more. The difference between the two arrangements was that
pumasi was seasonal or task-specific, and ture was for a year or
several years. Finally, hyongyaku was an obligation on the wealthy
people of the village, stereotypically yangban, to maintain a school, a
famine reserve, and other such things that ordinary people could not
normally contribute to. The ri chief would initiate and
coordinate such activities, and resolve disputes; the myong chief was
primarily concerned with coordinating collective works involving more
than one ri and with settling disputes between ris --on the location
and size of weirs and the like.
In the Japanese period, Japanese largely replaced Koreans in the
appointive hierarchy, although Japanese-trained Koreans did eventually
move upward, particularly in the military and police. By a series of
changes, local administration came to be focussed on the myong. In
1931, myongs were classified into myong (more rural) or yu (same as up;
more urban). Both were provided with elective bodies, who tended
to be largely Korean balancing the largely Japanese appointive
administrative staffs and somewhat compensating for the elimination of
the formerly elective myong chief. At the same time, however, the ri
and dong were eliminated as autonomous juridical units, and the common
material properties they formerly had controlled were legally
transferred to the myong or up. This necessarily also removed the legal
or state recognition of the material basis of the common social
properties that had been used to maintain them--although the local
community's use-rights continued to be recognized and they continued to
appoint their respective chiefs and maintain their properties
informally. At the same time, the colonial government introduced the
rather vaguer concept of "village works," maul fuei, to cover much the
same area as don ture-- namely local labor conscription to maintain
public properties, but in this case not village properties so much as
government properties near villages, like portions of highways.
In 1946 the American Military Government issued an order making the ku
head and ri head elective, but this lapsed under the Rhee
administration . The Local Government Act of 1949 established elective
councils for each level of government, but this too was without
effect. Officials down to the myong level continue to be central
government appointees.
The current organization dates from the "Temporary" local government
act of 1961, which made "local" government still more remote from
natural communities. The Act integrated up and myong as
subdivisions of kun, and the kun became the lowest autonomous
governmental level. Since under the Japanese reforms of 1931, the
material common properties formerly owned by dongs and ris had been
absorbed by ups and myongs, these same properties were now vested with
the even more remote kun head.
Prior to 1945, villages normally contained both peasant and yangban
families. Large yangban landholdings were common. Yangban landlords,
although often wholly or partly resident in the cities, would leave
relatives or managers in the village who would also serve as village
heads or as senior councilors to such heads. Land reform largely
resulted in the former large landowners leaving the villages, as did
many of the poorest families. The larger landowners left because
they lost their land; the poorest because they were unable to buy it
and the cities offered relatively greater opportunities. The
major beneficiaries of the redistribution were middle-class peasants,
who remained in the countryside . Since government reforms did
not recognize the natural village officially, they had no direct
bearing on the relative power of yangban at the village level in
these changing circumstances. Generally, village leadership since land
reform has depended mainly on seniority in the clan system. It is most
rigid in single clan villages, and most flexible in multi-clan
villages.
Agricultural Support Organizations.
There was no organized governmental support for agriculture under the
Yi dynasty, apart from some concern with irrigation works after the
17th century. The Japanese administration attempted to build a
modern agro-industrial system using large-scale and heavily capitalized
farms in Korea which they could not build in Japan because of the
fragmented holdings and greater limitations on the use of central
power. The agricultural program was concentrated in the south, as
industrial development was concentrated in the north, but it was mainly
in the hands of immigrant Japanese. The large farms were broken
up in the land reform, but the infrastructure and support system
largely remained in place.
The modern agricultural support system has four recognized "pillars,"
which developed and fell into place slowly and with many false starts
in the period since independence. These are the system of local
government (under the Home Ministry), the National Agricultural
Cooperative Federation (under the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries), the Rural Development Authority (Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries), and Saemaul Undong (Home Ministry).
The Rhee administration, at American urging, initiated a wide range of
agricultural support/rural development organizations, including 4-H,
Community Development, and Cooperatives, but these were generally
failures for the usual reasons associated with authoritarian
administrations. The 4-H organization, for example, was treated by Rhee
"as the youth wing of his Liberal party....But the Korean 4-H leaders
rarely strayed from their offices, the members were not asked to
do much beyond rallying for political sloganeering and to denounce
Rhee's enemies, and thus ruralites..treated the movement
indifferently... ." Community Development, notable as the
first rural program to use resident village level workers (who were
mostly college graduates), was focused directly on enhancing local
development capabilities. But the villages initially selected
were exceptionally favored by infrastructure (roads and markets) and
were generally one-clan villages. The workers and resources devoted to
them were unrealistically rich. So the program quite naturally
failed to reproduce its initial success when the government attempted
to replicate it with the more usual level of resources on a kun-wide
basis rather than village by village. Cooperatives were corrupt,
and the act which established them did not allow them to offer credit.
Lending was reserved exclusively to the Farmers' Bank, and nothing
compelled the two organizations to cooperate. Extension, in Korea
called "guidance" (which more accurately reflects its top-down,
directive character), was reestablished in 1957 after the military
government had shut down the Japanese system. It was "seen more
favorably by farmers because it was in fact apolitical, but for that
same reason was treated indifferently by the central government" .
The reorganizations of 1961 and 1962 resolved many problems within and
among the various agricultural support organizations, but at the same
time made them even more wholly responsible to the central government
and more remote from local communities. Cooperatives were merged with
the Farmers Bank as the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation. The NACF provided a full range of functions including
lending, advising, purchasing, storing and selling of products, and
joint purchase of chemicals, equipments and other supplies. At
the same time, the organizational level was moved up from the up or
myong level to the si or kun. The primary cooperatives, formerly at the
ri level, were moved to the myong. NACF now supplies about 95 percent
of all rural credit, at subsidized rates which are lower for activities
to which the government assigns higher priorities . It also administers
the government food-grain procurement program under the Grain
Management Fund, which was established in 1960 to buy rice and barley
at legislatively mandated and usually relatively high farm prices and
redistribute it at lower subsidized prices to urban markets .
The president of the NACF is appointed by the President of the
Republic, under guidance of Minister of Agriculture, and the
organization follows the government hierarchy. The President of
NACF is assisted by both an elected assembly and an administrative
board on which sit representative of the Ministries of
Agriculture-Forestry and Finance and of the Bank of Korea .
Parallel organizations exist at each level down to kun. The rules of
the myong level primary cooperatives are determined by the government
and not by the membership .
Other new laws consolidated and coordinated the other previously
established programs under the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
In 1961, president Park announced the National Reconstruction Movement,
and it was apparently in this connection that the Community Development
program was transferred from the Ministry of Construction in the same
year. In 1962, the Rural Development Act brought in the extension
functions, which had been administered outside the general government,
and the integrated organization and program was labeled the Rural
Development Agency. New do Agriculture Promotion Bureaus consolidated
the functions of the do Agriculture Bureau, various sorts of
agriculture and forestry laboratories, and do Community
Development. City or kun Rural Consulting Centres
consolidated the consulting programmes on farming and life improvement,
Community Development, sericulture, and livestock farming.
Coordination with other offices of local government was assured by
links at the top between the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and
the Ministry of Home Affairs, while coordination with the NACF was
assured because the NACF was itself under the Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries. In this way, a single administrative system for
rural development was realized. In 1963, the dong and ri
Standardization Programme which had been under the Ministry of Interior
was also transferred to the Rural Development Agency and expanded to
operate as a holistic Rural Consulting Program.
In 1969 the Rural Development Agency introduced the use of Resident
Consultants. In this program, units of 2 to 3 dongs and ris grouped
together and designated a person to serve as a resident consultant to
work in collaboration with the itinerant consultant of the kun
unit. These resident consultants were trained at a 7 week
specialists' course organized at the national level and sent to 317
districts, one for each district, in order to introduce modern farm
management, improve the agricultural structure, rural life and
environment, and assist the district's residents to organize themselves
so that they would be able to formulate and implement their own local
social development plans. Unquestionably, the rural support structure
and "guidance system" which all of these changes created was effective
at developing sound technical advice (within the context of central
government policy) and getting it to farms throughout Korea.
Nevertheless, the outlook at the end of the 1960's was not good.
Although agricultural productivity rose in the 1960's, particularly
after 1963, it was not enough to keep pace with demand. Grain imports
were 12 percent of domestic production in late 1960s and rose to more
than 20 percent in the early 1970s . President Chun repeatedly called
for self-sufficiency in food-grains. Increasing demand reflected
increased urban populations, but since these populations were largely
made up of migrants from rural areas, there was less labor available on
the farms to do the work. After the mid-1960's the farm population
began to decline in absolute as well as relative terms . Agricultural
growth had been only about 2/3 of industrial growth in the first plan,
and in the second plan period had been only 1/5. The gap between
urban and farm incomes had widened. A further shift of people to cities
was foreseen, worsening both urban living conditions and rural labor
problems and increasing the production gap still further. The
government recognized that the unbalanced growth plans had left too
little support for agriculture, and concluded that it had to invest
much more. The third five year plan (1972-76) emphasized balanced
growth , but up to that point the record did not provide a great deal
of assurance that simply increasing spending was going to solve the
problems.
This is the setting into which saemaul undong was introduced.
Saemaul Undong, or "New Community
Movement":
The exact motivation of the start of Saemaul Undong is disputed. It is
accepted that from October 1970 to June 1971 the Government distributed
335 bags of surplus cement at its own expense to each of Korea's
approximately 33,000 mauls (villages--same as natural ri). Prior to the
delivery, the government had the myong chiefs inform ri chiefs it would
be coming. The government directed that the cement should be used for
improvement of economic infrastructure, without further instructions.
On delivery the cement was simply unloaded from a truck and left.
Afterwards, the myong chiefs, at the regular meetings, asked the ri
chiefs if it had arrived. There was, apparently, no mention of
"saemaul undong" in that connection, although according to official
accounts president Park had announced or proposed the inception of the
movement at a provincial governors meeting the previous April .
Responses were roughly of three types:
(1) Economic infrastructure development, as was directed...under the
existing traditional leadership and labor mobilization;
(2) Welfare environmental development, such as drinking water well,
public laundry, and drainage building...; and
(3) Not for particular projects. Cements were sold out to outsiders and
village people spent the money for drinking and feasts among them .
Some of the villages that had used the cement returned to the
government in the following year with a request for more -- plus
reinforcing rods. Later official accounts describe the initial
distribution a pre-conceived experiment to test peoples' responses. The
alternative view, which is consistent with more facts, is that the
surplus was unexpected and the government gave it to the villages only
in preference to other forms of disposal. Whether or not the connection
between the distribution and the previous announcement or proposal of
saemaul undong was made then or later is uncertain. (President Park's
quoted statement is only that rural life could be improved, and that
governors and concerned officers should study how to do it.) In any
case the reaction caught them by surprise. According to those that were
there, what was created was indeed a "movement."
Two things happened at the central level in response to the requests
for more cement. First, after asking local officers to check and
receiving back a count that about half the villages had indeed used the
cement (not worrying about how), 16,600 of the first group of villages
were designated as having shown "self-help spirit" and were told they
would receive 600 sacks of cement and a ton of reinforcing rods in
1972, which they did . When it was delivered, the myong chiefs
told the village representatives that more would follow in the next
year as well, for villages that made good use of it. Again, this
was an entirely oral and informal procedure, and no one said in advance
what such use had to be. This was not the way the government usually
worked.
The second thing that happened, to quote the official account, was
that:
"The Saemaul Undong Central Consultative Council was organized under
the chairmanship of the Minister of Home Affairs, with the
vice-ministers of all the concerned ministries and agencies as its
members. Similar organizations were established at each successive
level, i.e., province, county, township, and village. Saemaul
Leader's Training Institute was opened in this year. At the same
time, a strong political support was given to Saemaul Movement by
President Park Chung Hee who "made a special announcement in October
1972 that "Saemaul projects should receive the highest priority of all
the projects of the government." "
The result, it seems, was a kind of development fever. The local
officials were suddenly pressed from above and below to help things
happen without only the barest guidelines on just what those things
should be. Villagers, at last, could identify their own needs,
and equally importantly they did not have to bother with things they
did not want. It seems that what got the most local support were
just those kinds of small projects that a few people can undertake and
that produce a substantial benefit for everyone, injuring none -- like
a common laundry area, improved sanitation, or better well. Such
things, precisely because they produce diffuse benefits for all, are
the most difficult to raise money for in ordinary circumstances in a
poor community, but the easiest to find political support for.
Very often, they are things which affect most closely the work women
normally do. And finally, such things need not require the power or
influence which a local notable might have with those higher up.
They are a natural vehicle for new leaders with energy and initiative
to assert themselves.
It is clear from the official documents of the time that the first
three years, at least, were formative. The government was running hard
to keep up and understand what was happening, but did not have full
control. In 1972, a national Saemaul Leaders Training Institute
was opened -- to instill the spirit of "diligence, self-help, and
cooperation, " under the personal leadership of a charismatic former
high school principle well known as an advocate of the moral value of
rural life. The curriculum was necessarily unsettled, but concentrated
on case studies and group discussion, which he led
personally. In 1973, Saemaul offices were established in
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Commerce and Industry, and
Education. In the same year, National Reconstruction Movement of
1961 was officially dissolved . In effect, the saemaul undong was seen
as having succeeded it as a more effective way to mobilize the same
official organizations, and the less "top down" approach of the saemaul
undong was widely recognized as what had made the difference in
effectiveness .
Also in 1973, it was determined to expand the program back to all
villages in Korea. To do this villages were classified as 1)
underdeveloped (also called basic) (total number 18,415), 2) developing
(also self-help) (total number 13,943), and 3) developed (total number
2,307). Note that the latter two numbers add up to 16,000-- which is to
say about the same number that received cement in the second
round. That is, the "underdeveloped" villages were those that had
not yet done anything or asked for more; the others were those that
had. For the first, it would be the responsibility of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, alone (in the person of the myong chief), to
stimulate some effort to make the kind of improvements in the general
"living environment" that the first villages had undertaken. Once
villages did this, they were deemed to have saemaul leaders, whoever
they might be and however they might have arisen, and such leaders were
then encouraged to organize and go to the other ministries for further
projects, focussing mainly on infrastructure for the "self-help"
villages and income generating projects for the "developed". At the
same time, because of the change in national plan priorities, much
higher levels of subsidy were available for these programs, and the
saemaul coordinating committees continued to stimulate and compete with
the other government agencies with whom they had overlapping areas of
concern, such as the RDA, just as they encouraged villages to compete
with each other in making improvements.
In 1975, partly in response to the oil crisis, saemaul undong under
president Chun put increased stress on regimentation to meet targets
set by the national government, such as vigorously pressing farmers to
grow more high yielding rice and double cropping (which led to a 1.4
percent drop in rice production in 1979 followed by a 34 percent drop
in 1980 , greatly reducing farmers willingness to respond to such
urging).
In 1976 a 378-page book of formal application guidelines was published
by the Saemaul Undong Central Consultative Council. This required
"detailed" statements of objectives, quantitative targets, work
schedules, statements of methods of implementation, statements of local
support , statements of how supervision and evaluation would be carried
out, statements of how the benefits would be divided, and so on .
Concurrently, the government began placing much greater emphasis on
saemaul training as propaganda to mobilize internal support , and began
its continuing program of advertising the movement internationally as a
symbol of its development effectiveness. The original founder-teacher
of the training program had left, and the curriculum had become
fixed and bureaucratized. It is not possible to know whether the
naive paternalistic tone that now runs through the institute's
case studies (repeatedly suggesting that before saemaul undong village
poverty reflected only mental and moral inertia and lack of a
"self-help spirit") was there from the beginning or reflects the
inclusion from 1974 of the "social elite" and government workers in the
program, but is difficult to see it as useful to very many actual
village leaders. Thus 1976 seems to mark the end of saemaul
undong as a true popular movement and its institutionalization as an
administrative program. But the program still retained distinct marks
from its irregular birth and continued to be an important vehicle for
rural development.
The saemaul undong occupied the gap which had been created by the
withdrawal of the agricultural support system upward from the village
level. In effect, it connected the concerned agencies back to the
village level through the mechanism it provided for recognizing both
the natural village and the new leadership within it, and it backed
this recognition with very substantial subsidies.
"The government had early abandoned the uneconomic village level
cooperatives, consolidating them at the myong, so saemaul moved direct
government intervention back into the villages. The program was placed
under the control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and in the early
1980s was headed by President Chun's younger brother (who was in 1988
charged with corruption).... By 1986, $9.3 billion had been spent on it
since its inception; of this amount, $5.5 billion came from the
government, the remainder from the villagers. ... [The] saemaul
movement appointed leaders, who were often young and vigorous and were
not part of the traditional village elite pattern. It set goals for
material accomplishments; attempted to stress moral regeneration,
loyalty to the state, and obedience to authority; acted as a type of
local tax agency; and allocated labor requirements by family.
There was scarcely a village that lacked an action plan, in
military, flip-chart form, indicating the annual objectives for village
improvement.
[From the distribution of cement] the program expanded to
include the elimination of grass roofs and the construction of bridges
and culverts, village access roads, and latrines; it has also improved
farm production and animal husbandry. It implemented what may be the
most extensive and effective national reforestation program in the
world... It is later stages, it sponsored the mass building (with
subsidized loans totalling $747 million) of 306,000 improved units of
new, Western-style housing of dubious aesthetic qualities. It was
broadened to include a rural factory movement of more than seven
hundred plants. For the most part, that factory movement failed, but
the saemaul movements in the early 1980's were expanded to include
urban factories, schools, and workplaces ."
" ...villages have had more opportunity to control their destinies
under the saemaul movement than at any point in Korean history. The
saemaul movement, by providing status to young, non-traditional
leadership, has been one of the most effective means of destroying the
traditional yangban-oriented social system... ."
Yet this is still not the whole picture. Supporting all of this were
substantial, indeed unsustainable, state investments that greatly
increased the incentives for market oriented initiatives at the farm
level.
During the 1970's the government raised the price of paddy from below
world market prices to more than double them, while protecting the
market against imports. But by 1984 the program for rice and
barley had accumulated a deficit of $1.7 billion. Subsidies for
fertilizer added another $700 million. Further subsidies included the
operation of uneconomic village-level bus routes. Structural
adjustment policies had been implemented in the early 1980s, and
subsidization dropped while inflation reduced the protection rate.
However with the presidential election of 1987, the government again
promised to increase produce subsidies for rice by 17 percent, to
answer opposition cries for improved rural living conditions .
Concurrently, an extensive highway building program had ended rural
isolation and provided market access. In 1958 Korea had only 503 miles
of paved roads. In 1985 there were 12,445 miles. Electricity reached
virtually every village, and television, refrigerators, and telephones
had become common. Sixty-eight percent of all households had piped
water .
Conclusion:
Korea's development has benefitted from its comparatively small size,
geopolitical position, highly educated population, and thorough
administration, but each of these has also created problems. It
has received substantial development assistance and private investments
(mainly from the United States and Japan, respectively) that have
closed what otherwise would have been disastrous gaps between imports
and exports and between internal expenditures and receipts. It has been
able, in about the last twenty years, to show vigorous agricultural
growth. Korea's agricultural development makes the case that an
authoritarian government can use its international position to buy
internal support or at least reduce opposition to manageable levels,
and it can improve rural living. It shows such a government can do more
with inducements than threats. But it does not make a case that such
government are more efficient than those that promote more genuine
local control and concentrate more on guaranteeing individuals freedom
to decide their own productive priorities on the basis of resource
prices closer to sustainable world market levels, any more than it
shows that the lack of progress in Korean agriculture prior to the mid
1960's was due to lack of a work ethic or spirit of self-help, rather
than clear negative incentives from inappropriate policies and
programs.
Saemaul undong received a favorable response from rural people. The
attractiveness of the subsidies were clearly essential to this
response, since fundamentally it evolved into a program for using
subsidies effectively. But it is certainly also relevant that saemaul
undong contrasted sharply with the much less effective National
Reconstruction Movement that preceeded it in being one of the few
programs where resources were made available outside of the established
system of control, where new leadership channels were encouraged, where
villages had a wide range of options in specifically what to do, where
it was actually possible to exercise a local veto on programs that were
not wanted, and where local people could select projects, particularly
local infrastructure projects, that were seen as providing general
benefits for all rather than benefits for some while injuring others.
In effect, at least in its formative stage, saemaul undong allowed
villagers to choose projects to fit their social circumstances and
avoid those which did not.